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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 


















BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 17095 
This is a custody dispute between ,the natural 
father and natural mother of a child born out of wedlock. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN 
THE TRIAL COURT 
This matter was tried to the Third District Court, 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The Court awarded 
custody to the Defendant. Plaintiff made a variety of post 
trial motions which resulted in an Amended Judgment (R. 
175), still awarding custody of the child to Defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the District Court's 
Amended Judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts the facts as set out in Appellant's 
Brief with the following exceptions: 
As to the care of the child the trial court found 
that Defendant had primary responsibility for 
the care of the child between August 15, 1978 and 
June 6, 19 7 9 ( R. 172) . 
Dr. Cooper testified that joint custody working 
successfully depends on the willingness of the 
parties to work out such an arrangement (R. 246) 
and that joint custody should not be ordered by 
the court over the objection of the parents 
(R. 252, 263). Dr. Cooper further testified 
that it was unlikely that these two parents 
could negotiate for Thaddeus' care (R. 255). 
Dr. Schneiman testified that there were no sub-
stantial differences in nurturing or parenting 
skills between the parties (R. 283-4). 
Both Dr. Cooper (R. 256-7) and Dr. Schneirnan 
(R. 286-7) testified that custody should be 
decided on the totality of factors not giving 
particular weight to economic resources. 
The trial court awarded custody to Defendant, 
finding that the best interest of the child would 
be so served (R. 173). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS DECISION UPON THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND THE DECISION 
IS SUPPORTED BY AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
This Court has established a stringent standard of 
review in cases concerning child custody awards. In the 
case of Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-512 (Utah 
1979) the court explained: 
A determination of the "best interests 
of the child" frequently turns on 
numerous factors which the trial court is 
best suited to assess, given its proximity 
to the parties and the circumstances. 
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Only where the trial court action is so 
flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse 
of discretion should the appellate forum 
interpose its own judgment. 
In the present case, the record shows that the 
determination by the trial court granting custody to the 
Defendant was based on ample evidence that such an award 
would best serve the interests of Thaddeus, the one and one-
half year old son of the parties, and should be upheld. 
The clearest basis for the court's award was the 
difference in care furnished the child by the parties. From 
the time that Thaddeus.was born, the Defendant has assumed 
the primary responsibility in caring for him. While the 
Defendant was living with the Plaintiff, she nursed the 
child (R. 327), took care of his medical needs (R. 330), 
took the child to work with her during the day (R. 327), and 
even joined with him in swinuning classes (R. 329). At 
night, when the Plaintiff was at home he and the Defendant 
shared child care responsibility (R. 327). However, the 
primary obligation to care for Thaddeus was always assumed 
by the Defendant. 
The Defendant testified at trial that, if awarded 
custody, she would continue to care for Thaddeus personally, 
rather than placing him in day c·are (R. 336, 337). 
Conversely, there is much evidence which shows 
that the Plaintiff has been unwilling or unable practically 
to spend as much time with Thaddeus. In June of 1979, the 
Plaintiff and Defendant separated. It was agreed that 
-3-
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Thaddeus would spend June and July with the Defendant and 
August with the Plaintiff. During August, while in his 
father's custody, Thaddeus spent most of his days in day 
care {R. 318). During January and February 1980, the 
parties stipulated that Plaintiff would have sole custody of 
Thaddeus for approximately two weeks. The Plaintiff testified 
at trial that during that two week period, Thaddeus was 
again placed in day care during the daytime {R. 319). 
Further, there is nothing in the record which would indicate 
that the Plaintiff would not similarly place Thaddeus in day 
care if given custody of the boy {R. 241) . 
Clearly, a single parent often is forced to choose 
between full time employment outside of the home and personally 
caring for his or her child during the day. The choice is 
not an easy one. It is understandable that the Plaintiff, 
if given custody, would be forced to place Thaddeus in day 
care as long as he continued at his present employment. 
However, for a child as young as Thaddeus, the trade-off 
between the Plaintiff's earning power and the Defendant's 
willingness to be a full-time parent is best resolved in 
favor of the party who will care for the child at home. The 
Washington Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in 
In re Guardianship of Palmer, 81 Wash. 2d 604, 503 P.2d 464 
(1972). The court stated that the issue of the relative 
wealth of the parties was immaterial and that the significant 
focus was on which party could provide the child with the 
greatest degree of affection and discriminating care. In 
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the present case, the Defendant is that person and the 
Court, correctly recognizing this, awarded her custody. 
The Plaintiff makes much of his superior financial 
capability and states that the trial court judge ignored 
such considerations in making his decision. The record, 
however, indicates that the trial court did not refuse to 
consider the relative wealth of the parties (R. 367, 380, 
381). He merely refused to weigh this consideration as 
heavily as the Plaintiff would have desired. He weighed 
this factor as one among many, as both expert witnesses 
suggested. In light of Thaddeus' young age, the Defendant's 
testimony that her parents were willing to provide some 
financial support (R. 341) and her testi~ony that she would 
seek part-time evening employment in Connecticut (R. 337), 
the judge's determination that the isolated issue of relative 
finances had no bearing on the issue of parental fitness (R. 
311) was not unreasonable. 
Utah case law does not support the Plaintiff's 
contention that money in and of itself is a sufficient basis 
upon which to award custody. The Plaintiff cites Jorgensen 
v. Jorgensen, supra, for the proposition that money is a 
central issue in a child custody case. But the Plaintiff 
ignores that in Jorgensen, the trial court based its decision 
on other factors in addition to the father's relative wealth. 
This court emphasized that the mother had indiscreetly 
engaged in two extramarital sexual relationships with different 
-5-
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men, that the child was older, and that, as stated by Chief 
Justice Crockett, there were "special circumstances ... which ... the 
Court's decision advisedly omitted from fuller exposition." 
599 P.2d at 512. In the present case there were no such 
extenuating circumstances. Standing alone, the Plaintiff's 
superior income is not controlling and is only one factor of 
many that the trial court evaluated. 
Similarly in the recent case of Nielson v. Nielson, 
(Utah Sup. Ct. filed October 29, 1980), this court considered 
relative finarj:~.ial situations of the parties only an "additional 
factor" and considered this only in light of the special 
circumstances in that case. 
Appellant claims that the trial court improperly 
applied three legal standards, Appellant's Brief at 12; 
however, only one of these is in fact a legal standard - the 
tender years presumption which is explored in Point II 
below. Appellant maintains that the trial court abused his 
discretion by considering evidence of the Plaintiff's 
insensitivity to the Defendant and his refusal to marry her 
so as to allow Thaddeus the advantages of being born in 
wedlock. However, the record does not indicate that the 
judge's consideration of such evidence imposed a "greater 
burden upon the natural father of the child than upon the 
child's natural mother" as the Plaintiff asserts. 
Such evidence was considered as a basis upon which 
. 
to assess the Plaintiff's character and was indicative of 
-6-
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the Plaintiff's unwillingness to make sacrifices for Thaddeus 
as compared to the Defendant's (R. 361). The consideration 
was not gender based and could have been applied just as 
easily to a natural mother who was unwilling to legitimate a 
child through marriage. 
Appellant makes much of the trial court's discussion 
of the illegitimate status of the child. However this 
discussion in no way interfered with the correct legal 
standard that the court applied - the best interests test 
(R. 173). In fact the trial court recognized and applied 
this test which was consistent with Judge Durham's pre-trial 
order on this issue (R. 88). Since the correct standard was 
used, the focus on certain attitudes and behaviors of either 
party which the court chose to focus on are within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
Finally, the trial court did ·not abuse its discretion 
in refusing to award both parties joint custody of Thaddeus. 
Joint custody, or any other custody arrangement, 
is within the broad equitable powers of the trial court in 
custody proceedings. While this court has never specifically 
discussed the standards to be applied in determining whether 
joint custody is appropriate, the court has approved a 
variety of custodial arrangements which display some variation 
from the traditional single custody award. See e.g. Sampsell 
v. Holt, 202 P.2d 550 (Utah 1949). 
-7-
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While the experts are divided on the general issue 
of joint custody and its effects on children, there seems to 
be agreement that this arrangement is not appropriate for 
parents who cannot cooperate with each other. See Dodd 
y_:_ Dodd, 93 Misc.2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1978), 
and generally, Joint Custody: An Alternative for Divorced 
Parents, 26 U.C.L.A.L.R. 1084 (1979) at 1110-11. 
Testimony from both experts here, Drs. Cooper and 
Schneiman, was that joint custody, while an ideal, was 
unlikely to work in the present circumstances (R. 247-8, 
286). The Defendant testified she planned to live in Connecticut 
to be with her family. In his testimony, Dr. Schneiman 
explained that where the mother and father lived a great 
distance apart it would be difficult to arrange for a division 
of time where the child spent relatively short visitation 
periods with each parent. According to Dr. Schneiman, such 
short alternating custody periods are necessary to provide a 
young child with the necessary degree of consistency and 
predictability in his environment (R. 278). 
Here Appellant and Respondent live at opposite 
ends of the United States making communication expensive and 
difficult and joint decision-making near impossible. This 
geographic situation, as well as the difficulties encountered 
by the parties prior to and during the temporary court-
ordered joint custody period (R. 285, 305, 317, 335-6) 
indicate that joint custody is not appropriate here. Cer-
-8-
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tainly, this court could, as Appellant seeks, set out appropriate 
standards to use in resolving joint custody disputes in this 
case; however, any such standards must include the court's 
appraisal of the ability of the two parents to work together 
which both the experts and the trial court here considered 
and found lacking. 
While joint custody may be desirable in certain 
circumstances, its application in the present case would not 
be in the best interest of Thaddeus, and the trial court so 
found. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE TENDER 
YEARS PRESUMPTION AS AN ALTERNATE BASIS FOR 
ITS CUSTODY AWARD. 
This court has had a number of occasions in recent 
years to discuss the tender years presumption and its applica-
tion in resolving child custody disputes in Utah. While the 
presumption was once traced to U.C.A. §30-3-10, the 1977 
amendments to that section removed any such presumption. 
Previous cases had split on the issue of whether that section 
applied only to separations or to divorce cases as well. It 
is now clear that there is no "statutory" tender years 
presumption. Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 307 (Utah 1977); 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra. There remains however the 
"invariably declared policy stated in our decisions ... that 
'all things else being equal, preference should be given to 
.. 
the mother in awarding custody of children of tender years' 
II Smith v. Smith, supra. . . . . 
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The problem has arisen in reconciling the "best 
interests" test with the "tender years presumption." The 
clearest analysis seems to be that "the presumption is sub-
ordinate to the higher rule that the paramount concern in 
such cases is the best interest and welfare of the child." 
(emphasis added). Bingham v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 703 (Utah 
1978) . The best interest standard has also been ref erred to 
as "the controlling factor," Henderson v. Henderson, 576 
P.2d 1289 (Utah 1978), or the "primary consideration," 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra. In each of these cases the 
court found that the best interest test predominated over 
the presumption. In both Jorgensen and Henderson, the 
appellant mother sought to have the court overturn a custody 
award to the children's father. Both cases were affirmed, 
this court stating that the trial court's findings that the 
evidence predominated ia favor of the father and thus he was 
awarded custody were based on the best interest test, rather 
than some sort of automatic award to the mother under the 
guise of the tender years presumption. 
As discussed previously, the evidence in the 
present case supports the trial court's finding that the 
best interest of the child are served by awarding custody to 
the mother (R. 257-8). But assuming arguendo, that the 
"best interest" te~;t alone does not preponderate in favor of 
the Defendant, at the least the evidence shows that the 
parties would make equally good.parents and the tender years 
-10-
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presumption was properly applied as a separate and alternative 
basis for the custody award (R. 173 paragraph 2). 
The trial court found that the Defendant and the 
Plaintiff were equally fit (R. 367), and that both parents 
love the child equally (R. 360) . Such a finding was supported 
by the testimony of Dr. Cooper and of Dr. Schneirnan. The 
parties were found to have similar parenting skills by both 
experts (R. 245, 268). 
A determination that "all things are equal" does 
not require that all things be the same. That the Plaintiff 
m~kes more money than the Defendant does not necessarily 
mean that circumstances preponderate in favor of him, since 
other factors may well balance this fact. The Defendant's 
willingness to personally care for Thaddeus and to be at 
home with him during the day should be given great weight. 
It is such a willingness to personally nurture and care for 
a child which is at the heart of a tender years presumption 
in f~ivor of a mother. This idea is aptly expressed in State 
v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289, 77 Misc. 2d. 1.78 (1973): 
The rule giving the mother preferen-
tial right to custody is considerably 
softened by the realization that 'all 
things never are exactly equal' and 
it is predicated upon the acts of 
motherhood ~ not the fact of mother-
hood. Likewise, the rule will yield 
if the welfare of the child demands 
it, because this is not a presumption 
of law but a simple fact of life 
gleaned from human experience, and the 
courts are not timid in entrusting 
children into their f qthers care and 
custody when their best interests will 
be served thereby. (citations omitted 
and emphasis added) 
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Utah courts have applied a similar rationale to 
the tender years presumption. In Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994, 
996 (Utah 1975) this Court noted that 
there is wisdom in the traditional 
patterns of thought that the roles 
of mother and father are such that all 
other things being comparatively equal, 
the children should be in the care of 
their mothers, especially so children 
of younger years. (emphasis added) 
When viewed in light of the evidence, the maternal 
preference in the present case operated as a function or 
role-based distinction, not a gender-based distinction. And 
the presumption, if applied at all by the trial court, did 
not result in a decision which was contrary to the best 
interests of Thaddeus. 
III. 
APPLICATION OF THE TENDER YEARS PRE-
SUMPTION ACCORDING TO UTAH CASE LAW IS 
VALID UNDER THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In the case of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 
(1972), the United States Supreme Court held that an Illinois 
statute containing an irrebuttable presumption that unmarried 
fathers are incompetent to raise their children violated the 
due process clause. The Court found that due process required 
a more individualized determination. In U.S. Department of 
Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), Justice Marshall's 
concurring opinion explained: 
The Due Process clause requires the 
government to act on an individualized 
basis, with general propositions serving 
-12-
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only as rebuttable presumptions or 
other burden shifting devices. That I 
think is the import of Stanley v. 
Illinois. 
The maternal preference, as applied in t11e present 
case and as articulated in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, supra, is 
easily distinguished from the constitutionally invalid 
Illinois law. The Illinois procedure prevented any inquiry 
into the parental fitness of an unmarried father. Conversely, 
the maternal presumption in Utah is a rebuttable one which 
is only triggered when other £actors indicate that both the 
mother's and the father's fitness are comparatively equal. 
The best interest of the child is always the controlling 
test. Bingham v. Bingham, supra. The father, married or 
unmarried, is always permitted to show any circumstances 
which would preponderate in his favor. 
In the present case, a full inquiry was made by 
the trial court into the compa~~tive fitness of both parties. 
The court engaged in the individualized determination which 
is required by Stanley and described in the Department of 
Agriculture case. 
In Caban v. Mohanuned, 441 U.S. 380 (1979), the 
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a statutory provision whereby an 
unwed mother was permitted to block the adoption of her 
child, while the unwed father had no such right. Gender-
based distinctions, the court held, must serve governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement 
of those objectives to be valid under the Fourteenth Amendment 
-13-
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Equal Protection Clause. In Caban the classification was 
unable to withstand judicial scrutiny because it was not 
substantially related to the State's interest in facilitating 
the adoption of illegitimate children. 
As discussed in Cox v. Cox, supra, Utah's maternal 
preference is not based on a gender based distinction as 
much as a role-based distinction. Certainly, a state has a 
valid interest in providing children with a parent who will 
best fulfill the nurturing "mother" function. Where this 
role would not be served best by the natural mother, the 
court's review of the child's best interest would most 
likely result in a custody award in favor of the father. 
When a court has considered in depth the relative 
fitness of the parties and both are equally loving, competent 
parents, it is not unreasonable for a court to rely on the 
tender years presumption as a basis for its decision, 
especially where the woman is willing to fulfill the "mother 
function" on a fulltime basis, since it is the state's 
interest in providing children with such a parent which is 
at the core of the maternal preference. When applied in 
such a way, the presumption meets the standard announced by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), 
that "a classification must be reasonable ... so that all 
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." 
Appellant relies on Arnold v. Arnold, 604 P.2d 109 
(Nev. 1979), to undercut the continued validity of the 
-14-
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tender years presumption. But the analysis of Arnold is 
nearly identical to this Court's language in Bingham, 
Henderson and Jorgensen discussed above. The Nevada court 
stated that the "touchstone of all custody determinations is 
the best interests of the child," 604 P.2d at 110. The 
court held that custody to the father was in the child's 
best interest and rejected the mother's appeal. This cour·t 
has applied an almost identical analysis but has not totally 
discredited the presumption. However, as applied in Utah 
and demonstrated in this case, no due process or equal 
protection problem arises. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Appellant's Motion for a New Trial was denied by 
the trial court. The case law in Utah is clear that the 
granting of a U.R.Civ.P. Rule 59 Motion is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and that this ruling should 
not be overturned unless it "clearly transgressed any reasonable 
bounds of discretion." Hyland v. St. Marks Hospital, 427 
P.2d 736, 738 (Utah 1967). Here appellant claims prejudice 
based on the non-availability of respondent's welfare application 
at the time of trial. Yet her testimony at trial was not 
inconsistent with her statement in the welfare application, 
as she stated in her affidavit (R. 161). Further, appellant 
never sought to compel production of the document at any 
. 
time, never moved for a continuance based on the failure to 
-15-
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produce the document or even probed the area during cross-
examination. Finally, the form itself in blank was available 
at any time to appellant or his counsel to seek answers to 
the questions on the form via interrogatories or cross-
examination. This was not attempted either. No surprise or 
prejudice has occurred, no falsehoods were uttered and no 
basis for a new trial has been shown. The trial court's 
decision here should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court considered all the evidence including 
expert testimony and the testimony of the parties before 
determining that the child's best interests would be served 
by awarding custody to Respondent. This decision is well 
founded and should not be overturned by this Court. The 
tender years presumption as applied in this case is not 
violative of any person's constitutional rights, is subordinate 
to the best interests test, and constitutes an alternate 
basis for the custody award. No error has occurred in its 
application. The trial court acted within its discretion 
and denied Appellant's new trial motion. No basis for 
reversing this decision has been shown. The trial court's 
Amended Judgment should be affirmed. 
~ 
DATED this ~day of December, 1980. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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